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Interactive Geometry for Surplus Sharing in Cooperative Games
1. Introduction
The need to understand surplus- and cost-sharing rules in cooperative game theory is
prevalent at both the undergraduate and graduate levels (Moulin, 1988 and 2004).
However, the rules are generally depicted as raw mathematical problems that entail the
calculation of a vector of allocations. This paper presents interactive geometrical
depictions of the rules for games with small numbers of players (the executable program
in win32 platform is available at http://cc.usu.edu/~slk1r/teaching/tugames/tugame.htm).
The program (i) demonstrates how the simplexes associated with a host of characteristic
functions are "shrunk" to their corresponding cores, (ii) calculates the corresponding
allocations using the Shapley Value, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus surplus-sharing
rules, and (iii) graphically depicts the locations of these allocations in the corresponding
cores. It is therefore a supplementary tool that can be used to enhance the instruction of
surplus-sharing rules in either undergraduate- or graduate-level cooperative game theory
courses.
The next section discusses the relevant preliminaries of cooperative game theory,
focusing on derivations of the Shapley Value and nucleolus surplus-sharing algorithms.
Section 3 discusses the interactive geometry for these rules. Section 4 concludes.
2. Preliminaries of Cooperative Games
Let N be a set of n players with 2N denoting the corresponding power set of N (i.e., the set
of all possible coalitions based on N, including the empty and grand coalitions) and

v : 2 N → R denoting a characteristic function that allocates some outcome (e.g.,
coalitional cost or surplus) among each element of 2N. An allocation in the grand
coalition of the n players is represented by x = ( x1 ,…, xn ) . The core of the game (N, v) is
the set of all allocations that induces each of the n players to rationally join in the
formation of the grand coalition, i.e.,

⎧
⎫
core( N , v) = ⎨x : ∑ xi ≥ v( N' ) for all coalitions N' ∈ 2 N ⎬ .
⎩ i∈N'
⎭
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Provided that v generates solely positive values (i.e., surplus as opposed to cost),
three common types of games are typically considered:
(i)

Additive: for all disjoint coalitions N1 ,N 2 ∈ 2 N , v(N1 ∪ N 2 )= v(N1 )+v(N 2 )

(ii)

Superadditive: for all disjoint N1 , N 2 ∈ 2 N , v( N1 ∪ N 2 ) ≥ v( N1 ) + v( N 2 )

(iii)

Convex: for all N1 , N 2 ∈ 2 N , v( N1 ∪ N 2 ) + v( N1 ∩ N 2 ) ≥ v( N1 ) + v( N 2 )

The core for games of type (i) is a singleton, i.e., xi = v({i}) for each player i,
corresponding to the Shapley value. Games of type (iii) guarantee a non-empty core that
includes the Shapley value. Games of type (ii) are a parent class of types (i) and (iii), but
unlike types (i) and (ii) the existence of the Shapley value in the core is not ensured.1
We can represent the marginal contribution of agent i to coalition N' as

v( N '∪{i}) − v( N ' ) where i ∉ N ' . We have as many as 2 N ' −1 such values relative to all
possible coalitions in 2 N '\{i} , where |N'| represents the cardinality of coalition N'. An
allocation obtained by a weighted average of these marginal contributions therefore
accounts for the "marginality" of this agent. A special set of weights yielding allocations

xi =

| N '|!(n− | N '| −1)!
[v( N '∪{i}) − v( N ' )],
n
!
N
\
{
i
}
N '∈2

∑

(1)

is known as the Shapley value (SV) of game (N, v).
Calculation of the SV is straight-forward, particularly for games with small numbers
of players. For example, in the three-player game with coalitional surpluses depicted in
Table 1,

x1 =

2!0!
1!1!
1!1!
0!2!
(9 − 6) + (5 − 3) + (4 − 2) +
(1 − 0) = 2 .
3!
3!
3!
3!

Similar calculations for players 2 and 3 yield allocations x2 = 3 and x3 = 4, respectively.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
The nucleolus provides an alternative method of obtaining an allocation x. Begin by
noting that the net benefit, or "excess" for the members of coalition N' that results from
1

See Moulin (1988) for further details on the relationships between additivity, superadditivity, convexity,
the core, and the Shapley value. Examples of each of these outcomes for game types (i) – (iii) can be
shown using the interactive geometry presented in Section 3.
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joining the grand coalition is given by

∑

i∈N '

xi − v( N ' ) . Also note that there are 2n

values of such coalition-wise net benefits associated with forming the grand coalition
(including the empty and grand coalitions). The basic concept of the nucleolus is to
choose an allocation x in such a way that the best leximin ordering of these values is
~ = (w
~ , …, w
~ ) of vector w = (w1,…,wm) is obtained
obtained.2 Here, a leximin ordering w
1

m

~ ≤…≤ w
~ . For example, if w =
by sorting w1,…,wm in ascending order, resulting in w
1
m

~ = (1,2,3) . Vector w is "leximin preferred" to u if there exists an m' such
(3,2,1), then w
that

% %.
w%m'' = u%
m'' for all m'' = 1,K , m' - 1 and wm' > um'

(2)

In other words, w is leximin preferred to u if the smallest element of w is greater than the
smallest element of u, or they are equal but the second smallest element in w is greater
than the second smallest element in u, and so on (Maniquet, 2002).
If we set e(x) =

(∑

i∈N'

x i − v(N ')

)

(2n ×1)

, which is a 2n ×1 vector accounting for each

element (i.e., coalition N’ ) in 2N, then the nucleolus, x * , is such that e(x*) is leximin
preferred to e( x) for any x. To see how the nucleolus is determined, consider the threeplayer game with coalitional surpluses depicted in Table 2 (Serrano, 1999).
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Following Serrano (1999), begin by considering the "equal-split" vector of surpluses
x = (14,14,14), where the individual surpluses sum to v(N) = 42. Thus, e(x) = (-12,2,8,14,14,14), where the worst-treated coalition is {2,3} with an excess of -12. From an
egalitarian perspective, it therefore seems to make sense to transfer some of player 1's
surplus to players 2 or 3. Let the transfer occur from player 1 to player 3, resulting in the
surplus vector z = (4,14,24) and the corresponding excess vector e(z) = (-2,-2,-2,4,14,24).
By (2) we see that e(x) is leximin preferred to e(z). Through iterative pairwise
comparisons of each leximin-ordered excess vector, it can then be shown that z is indeed
the nucleolus for this particular game. Hence, the nucleolus provides an egalitarian
2

See Moulin (1988) and Serrano (1999) for further details on the nucleolus.
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solution in terms of the coalition-wise net benefits associated with forming the grand
coalition.
The per-capita nucleolus is obtained in the same way as the nucleolus, except that

∑

i∈N '

xi − v( N ' ) is replaced with

∑

i∈N '

( xi − v( N ' )) / | N '| to account for the cardinality of

each coalition. We present the pseudocode used to calculate the nucleolus in Section 3.2.
(The actual C++ source code is available upon request from the authors.)
3. The Interactive Geometry
For graphical purposes, our interactive program specializes in three-player games. The
interface, depicted in Figure 1 for the SV (using the characteristic function depicted in
Table 1), consists of a view which draws a simplex and lines representing coalition-wise
values of the characteristic function. The user can set the values for the characteristic
function via a dialog box that appears by clicking the "Set" button on the toolbar
(discussed further in Section 3.3). The toolbar provides three additional buttons to
calculate the corresponding SV, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus. In the process of
determining these surplus-sharing values, the core is also determined by "shrinking" the
simplex according to the constraints on surpluses for each proper coalition. In the case of
Figure 1, the core represents 7.4% of the total area of the simplex.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
The program is built by C++ with object-oriented capabilities for graphical user
interface. Figure 2 describes the overall system relations.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
3.1. Construction of the Simplex and Determination of the Core
To see how the simplex is constructed and the core determined in Figure 1, consider its
partial construction in Figure 3. In this figure, the simplex is shown from its threedimensional perspective with the coordinates of each of its vertices normalized by the
surplus value of the grand coalition. Recalling from Figure 1 that the allocation for the
5

singleton coalition {1} is x1 = 1, or one-ninth of the value of the grand coalition, the area
denoted A is effectively "cut away" from the simplex. Similarly, based on the allocation
for the coalition {2,3} of x2 + x3 = 6, or two-thirds of the value of the grand coalition, the
area denoted B is also cut away from the simplex. This cutting away process is
performed for each of the proper coalitions listed in Figure 1 until the simplex has shrunk
to its core, depicted as the shaded area in Figure 1.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
3.2. Computation of the Surplus-Sharing Values
As discussed in Section 2, the interactive program computes and graphically depicts the
SV, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus allocations. Computation of the SV is performed
using (1). With respect to the nucleolus and per-capita nucleolus, recall that both of these
surplus-sharing allocations are derived using the same algorithm, except that the latter
divides the coalitional net benefits by their respective cardinalities. We therefore focus
solely on the computation of the nucleolus.
Although the search for the nucleolus involves finding a maxima, gradient-based
approaches (e.g., the Newton method) are not relevant since the values assigned by the
leximin ordering are in general non-differentiable. We therefore use the following
pseudocode to conduct a search in the two-dimensional simplex:

precision = 0.1
loop precision ≥ 0.001
loop 0 ≤ x1 ≤ v( N )
loop 0 ≤ x2 ≤ v( N ) − x1
“compare”
x2 ← x2 + precision
end loop
x1 ← x1 + precision
x2 ← 0
end loop
precision ← precision / 10
end loop
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where the “compare” command initiates comparisons of the leximin orderings. To sort
the comparisons, we then employ the following "Bubble Sort" algorithm.3
loop swapFlag = true
swapFlag = false
loop 1 ≤ m' ≤ m − 1
if wm' > wm'+1 then

swap( wm' , wm'+1 )
swapFlag = true
end if
end loop
end loop
The sorting procedure enables a straightforward comparison of the leximin ordered
vectors.
3.3. Construction and Representation of Characteristic Function
Characteristic functions are represented by an n-dimensional array of size two for each
dimension. This is because the power set 2N literary contains 2n elements. If we denote a
characteristic function by v[i][j][k] for three-player case, the representation is given by
identifying

v(∅) ≡ 0

with

v[0][0][0],

v({1})

with

v[1][0][0],

v({2,3})

with

v[0][1][1],

v(N )

with

v[1][1][1],

and so on.
Our program provides two options for specifying the characteristic function. One
option is to directly set the values of a characteristic function using the Set button. The
corresponding dialogue box is provided in panel (a) of Figure 4. The other option is to
select a predetermined characteristic function from the list presented in panel (b) of
Figure 4. The three main types of games presented in Section 2 (additive, superadditive,

3

The Bubble Sort algorithm is not the most time efficient algorithm. However, given our fixed dimension
of three-player games, this loss in efficiency is a non-issue.
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convex) are provided in both symmetric and asymmetric forms.4 The Elongated Core
assigns surpluses of 1 to each of the singleton coalitions {1}, {2}, and {3}, surpluses of 2
to coalitions {1,2} and {1,3}, and a surplus of 7 to coalition {2,3}. The Trapezoidal Core
also assigns surpluses of 1 to each of the singleton coalitions, but then assigns surpluses
of 2 to coalitions {1,3} and {2,3} and 5 to coalition {1,2}. The Wide Core is same as the
Elongated Core, except that coalition {2,3} is also assigned a surplus of 2. The
Boundary-Intersecting Core sets each of the singleton surpluses in the Wide Core to zero.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
As an example, Figure 5 presents the core and corresponding Shapley value for the
Elongated Core characteristic function.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
4. Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated an interactive program that can be used to supplement
undergraduate- and graduate-level cooperative game theory courses by graphically
demonstrating (i) the construction of the core and (ii) the determination and location of
the common Shapley value, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus surplus-sharing
allocations for games with three players. Because the geometry for the construction of
the core is common across all cooperative games, the program can conceivably be
augmented with new surplus-sharing rules as they are introduced in the literature. As a
result, the program can be thought of as a "one-stop" graphical interface for surplussharing games.

4

Symmetric(asymmetric) in this context means that individual surpluses assigned to the singleton
coalitions are equal(unequal). For example, the asymmetric convex characteristic function depicted in
panel (a) of Figure 4 assigns surpluses of 1, 2, and 3 to the singleton coalitions {1}, {2}, and {3},
respectively.
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Coalition

Coalitional Surplus

{1}

1

{2}

2

{3}

3

{1,2}

4

{1,3}

5

{2,3}

6

{1,2,3}
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Table 1. Coalitional Surpluses for Calculating the Shapley Value.

Coalition

Coalitional Surplus

{1}

0

{2}

0

{3}

0

{1,2}

20

{1,3}

30

{2,3}

40

{1,2,3}

42

Table 2. Coalitional Surpluses for Calculating the Nucleolus.
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Figure 1. The graphical interface.
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Figure 2. The overall systems relations.
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x3

x2+x3=6/9

A
x1 = 1/9

B
x2

x1
Figure 3. Partial construction of the core in Figure 1.
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(a) Defining a characteristic function.

(b) Loading predetermined example for characteristic functions
Figure 4. Interface for the characteristic functions.
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Figure 5. The Elongated Core Characteristic Function.

14

